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Abstract. In the United States, active church membership among ethnic and racial minorities has been
linked to higher political participation. In Europe, the influence of religious attendance on political mobi-
lisation of ethnic minorities has so far been little explored, despite the heated public debate about the public
role of religion and particularly Islam. This study uses the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study to
theorise the relationship between religious attendance and political participation of ethnic minorities in a
European context and extend existing theories to non-Christian minority religions. The article shows that
despite a significantly different context in which religion’s place in political life is more contentious, regular
religious attendance increases political participation rates of ethnic minorities. Some possible explanatory
mechanisms are tested and an important distinction is introduced between those mechanisms that mediate,
and those that moderate the impact of religion.The study finds that British minority churches and places of
worships vary in how willing and effective they are in politically motivating their worshippers, and con-
cludes that this relates to the political salience of certain religions within the United Kingdom context.
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Introduction
In the United States, political participation (including the right to participate) has been a
cornerstone in the struggle for equality among racial minorities.Historically, black churches
played an important role in this struggle, and church attendance among racial minorities
has been linked empirically to higher political participation (Olsen 1970; Verba et al. 1995;
Calhoun-Brown 1996; Jones-Correa & Leal 2001). Increasingly, Europe’s growing ethnic
minorities’ struggle for equality and representation mirrors the processes that have taken
place in the United States. Yet, we know little about the role of religious involvement in
mobilising political participation among European minorities.1 This article seeks to address
this question by investigating the impact of religious attendance on the political participa-
tion of ethnic minorities in a new context (Great Britain) and in new cases of non-Christian
religions such as Islam and Sikhism as well as Christianity (which has been the main focus
ofAmerican research).On the theoretical side, we distinguish explicitly between mediating
and moderating mechanisms and show the importance of the history of ethno-religious
struggles for understanding the role of religion.
Britain presents an especially interesting case for testing the effect of religious attend-
ance on participation because of the contested role of religion in British politics.Whereas
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in the United States the political relevance of religion is well acknowledged and accepted,
and in many European countries it is explicitly incorporated through policy (cf. Dutch
pillarisation), in Britain religion is more marginalised in political life and explicit references
to it from politicians are rare and controversial. The current Conservative–Liberal Demo-
crat coalition government has more openly acknowledged the civic role of religion in its Big
Society policy initiative (Kettell 2012) and Prime Minister David Cameron has made some
specific remarks on the nature of Britain as a Christian country, but, as many opinion polls
show, these references to religion remain unpopular. Generally, the British population is
rather intolerant of religious beliefs, as a recent study of public attitudes shows (Voas &
Ling 2009). Thus, minorities’ religious involvement is often perceived with distrust. This
negativity is especially pertinent in the context of the Muslim minority, who often stand
accused of prioritising their religious loyalties over their British identity (Field 2007). Yet,
the presence of a state church (the Church of England) and an array of laws recognising
religious rights, freedoms as well as the more recent inclusion of religion in anti-
discrimination legislation separate Britain from such secularist countries as France. As
Eggert and Giugni (2011) suggest, Britain has tended towards a pluralist approach to
cultural groups’ rights, which may provide opportunities for religious groups to facilitate
political action.
The most important advantage of studying the case of Great Britain, however, is the
wide array of non-Christian religions that can be studied and compared. Britain is unique
in this regard: both the United States and most European countries will only have Chris-
tianity and Islam readily available for comparison. As we will argue later, the chance to
look at a wider set of religions opens an opportunity to advance our understanding of
the link between minority political participation and historically salient ethno-religious
identities, as well as to extend theories of the role of religion in politics to more world
religions.
Existing literature shows that ethnic minorities in Britain are much more religious than
the white majority and attend their places of worship more regularly (Voas & Crockett
2005). In the 2010 British Election Study, only 36 per cent of the general population said
they attended religious worship more than just on festivals, whereas almost 70 per cent of
ethnic minorities declared doing so in the accompanying 2010 Ethnic Minorities British
Election Study (EMBES). In fact, the rates of religious participation of British minorities
are comparable to the levels of worship found in the United States (Putnam & Campbell
2010). But do these religious activities mobilise minorities politically? We will show that
religious attendance does, generally, contribute to increased levels of participation.
However, we will also argue that minority religions differ in how much they are associated
with histories of political struggle (both in their homeland and in Britain) and that this is
reflected in how effective these religions are at mobilising their faithful to participate in
contemporary British politics.
This article will proceed as follows.We will first consider how and why theories linking
religious attendance and political participation may apply in the British case. In particular,
we will discuss potential mediating and moderating mechanisms for explaining the asso-
ciation between attendance and participation. The ensuing sections of the article will deal
with the data, measurement issues and analysis. Finally, we will discuss the implications of
our findings for the wider treatment of the political role of religious involvement.
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Religious attendance and political participation of racial and ethnic minorities
In the United States, religious attendance has been shown to increase electoral partici-
pation (Peterson 1992; Wilcox & Sigelman 2001), other forms of political participation
(Beyerlein & Chaves 2003) and other civic activities (Becker & Dhingra 2001; Beyerlein
& Hip 2006). Two main mediating mechanisms have been identified: the acquisition of
political resources through attendance, and direct political mobilisation from the places of
worship. In their seminal work, Verba et al. (1995) proposed that racial minorities are
usually resource-poor and lack the basic civic skills needed to participate. For these
minorities, religious involvement is a major route for acquiring civic skills. While Verba
et al. (1995) focused mostly on the practical civic skills learned through religious partici-
pation, Calhoun-Brown (1996) showed that regular attendance in religious activities
increased relevant psychological resources such as political trust, political efficacy
and racial consciousness (a particularly important predictor of African Americans’
political mobilisation; see Chong & Rogers 2005). However, others have argued that
it is the direct political mobilisation coming from the place of worship that matters
(Brown & Brown 2003; Djupe & Gilbert 2006). Some individual congregations choose to
engage in more direct political debate and activity than others, and in this way influence
the political participation of their members. Therefore, it is the efforts of these specific,
individual ‘political churches’ rather than attendance per se that politically mobilises the
faithful.
Apart from these two mediating mechanisms, there are two possible moderating mecha-
nisms that may alter the relationship between attendance and political participation. In
particular, politicised black churches in the United States, predominantly attended by
AfricanAmericans, have been shown to bemore effective than other churches in mobilising
the political participation of their worshippers (Olsen 1970; Verba et al. 1995;
Calhoun-Brown 1996). Calhoun-Brown (1996) argued that regular attendance at the highly
politicised black churches was more effective in raising the levels of mediating psychologi-
cal resources, especially a sense of group racial consciousness.We argue that this moderat-
ing effect of the type of church could have two different explanations: it could arise as a
consequence of the predominantly co-ethnic composition of the place of worship and the
resulting ethnic social capital; or it could arise as a consequence of places of worship
articulating or promoting politicised identities arising from histories of ethno-religious
struggle or shared ethno-religious grievances.
With respect to the first possibility, although the moderating effect of black churches
is thought to originate from the central role they played in the civil rights movement
among African Americans, Jones-Correa and Leal (2001) found that the ethnic make-up
of the church also matters for the levels of participation of Latinos, whose mass immi-
gration to the United States came after the civil rights movement. Jones-Correa and Leal
argue that this is probably because attending majority-Latino churches increases the
sense of ethnic community and in turn increases the chances that Latino church members
will engage in community-based political action. This explanation parallels the emphasis
in European research on the role of ethnic social capital on minority political participa-
tion (Fennema & Tillie 1999; Jacobs & Tillie 2004; Morales & Giugni 2011; Maxwell
2010). Particularly relevant in this respect is the work of Klandermans et al. (2008), who
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show the moderating effect of social embeddedness on the relationship between a sense
of political efficacy and political participation.
A second possible explanation for the moderating effect of place of worship is that, in
cases where they are associated with a politicised minority group, places of worship may act
as vehicles for the articulation and expression of political concerns and hence stimulate
political participation among attendees.According to this line of argument (which has some
parallels with the historical political role of black churches in the United States), it is not so
much the ethnic composition and social embeddedness of worshippers as the historical
political concerns and grievances of the ethno-religious community that are crucial.
Among British ethnic minorities, who predominantly immigrated after the Second
World War and thereafter from South Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, these historical
political concerns and politicised identities are especially notable among Sikhs and
Muslims, whereas they are much less marked among Hindus or Christians. Our hypothesis,
therefore, is that it is in the case of Sikhs and Muslims that the effects of attendance on
participation will be stronger, whereas they will be weaker among Hindus and Christians.
We briefly review the historical backgrounds of these four religious traditions in order to
support this expectation.
Muslims came to Britain mostly from Pakistan, to a lesser extent Bangladesh and more
recently fromAfrica, so they are a fairly diverse group. Nonetheless, Pakistani Muslims are
dominant demographically and politically. In the United Kingdom,Muslims face a complex
political context. On the one hand, Islam is considered a socially conservative and insular
religion (Georgiadis & Manning 2011). In parallel to some Protestant evangelical denomi-
nations, who were found to encourage more inward, church-oriented participation or a
more insular outlook and self-segregation from the mainstream (Wuthnow 1999; Park &
Smith, 2000; Lam, 2002; Schwadel 2005; Driskell et al. 2008), this would give rise to the
expectation that regular mosque attendance could discourage mainstream political engage-
ment. This chimes in with the allegations that some British Muslims consider engaging in
British politics as validating a non-Islamic (haram) rule, which runs against their under-
standing of the prescriptions of Islam (BBC 2010). On the other hand, the literature on
British Muslims’ political attitudes paints them as a well-adjusted and politically well-
integrated group (Maxwell 2010), and Muslims in the United Kingdom appear to be
politically well-organised and represented (with the number of MPs of Muslim origin
having grown from two to eight after the 2010 parliamentary elections).
Muslim politicisation in the United Kingdom springs from a variety of international
conflicts in which Muslims are thought to be victims, and their perceived victimisation as a
religious group in the United Kingdom. The main such conflict imported into British
Muslim politics is over the Kashmir region, which is contested between Pakistan and India,
and from where many British Muslims originate (Werbner 2005). Also, conflicts such as
those in Palestine, or Bosnia in the 1990s, gained political attention among British Muslims,
and may be linked to the rise in political salience of Muslim identity (Werbner 2005).
Domestically, the emergence of Muslim political leadership in Britain, such as the Muslim
Council of Britain, can be traced back to the 1980s and the Rushdie affair, during which
many Muslims mobilised to protest against the publication of Salman Rushdie’s book The
SatanicVerses – a book they thought offensive to Islam.As a result they were the first South
Asian community to organise politically, and many of the organisations and leaders that
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emerged then remain important political players (Malik 2009). Finally, Muslims in Britain
are increasingly the main group against which prejudice is openly expressed both by the
ideological left and right in Britain (Choudhury 2009). Muslims also have an additional
potential political grievance as they are economically disadvantaged in Britain (Office for
National Statistics 2004; Khattab 2009). This group thus offers the closest comparison to
African Americans’ mobilisation against racism and disadvantage.
Sikhism is the second highly-politicised minority religion in Britain. While Sikhs in
Britain are diverse both in terms of geographic origin and caste (although less so than the
Hindu Indians), most Sikhs originate from Punjab in India and many speak Punjabi.
Crucially, Sikhism is not only a religion but is also an ethnic identity, akin to Judaism.
Elements of military struggle for independence have permeated this religion from its
inception, and it is part of traditional Sikh culture. Sikhs have experienced an oppressed
minority status even in their Indian homeland.Their struggle for independence reached its
zenith in the 1980s, and culminated in the tragic massacre in the Golden Temple in
Amritsar, Punjab, where the Indian army killed many civilians in their effort to clamp down
on Sikh separatists. This event is thought to be a direct cause for the 1984 assassination of
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards. This event received a lot of
attention, with some British Sikh politicians allegedly supporting the assassination.2 The
Sikhs’ homeland political struggle with the Indian state has been imported to Britain (Singh
& Tatla 2006: 102). In addition, Sikh places of worship (gurdwaras) are centres not only of
community life, but also of the political life of Sikhs in Britain (Singh & Tatla 2006: pp. 127,
134). Sikh political organisations mobilise explicitly through their control of gurdwaras,
from which they draw their followers and resources (Singh & Tatla 2006: 82).As a result, we
expect Sikhs to be particularly likely to be religiously mobilised, especially through attend-
ance at gurdwaras.
Hindus in Britain are divided through their two main routes of immigration: direct
migration from the Indian sub-continent and secondary migration from East Africa, where
Indians first settled under British colonial rule, but from which they were forced out during
the African states’ struggles for independence. Overlapping with this are additional diver-
gences of class, caste, region of origin and language.Despite this diversity, the British Hindu
population arrived in Britain with more education, transferable skills and often with greater
English fluency than other minorities (Office for National Statistics 2004). Consequently
they have been more successful in terms of socioeconomic advancement than most other
minority groups. Their social diversity, as well as lack of major grievances, has resulted in a
lack of shared political identity and organisation and hence low levels of politicisation
around religious belonging (Vertovec 1995). Hence, we do not expect British Hindus to be
particularly mobilised by their temple (mandir).
Ethnic minority Christians are the most diverse religious group: while most Caribbeans
are Christians, there are also many African and Indian-origin Christians in the United
Kingdom. There are also important denominational differences. As a result, we do not
expect there to be any shared historical concerns and grievances or distinctive politicised
identities among minority Christians. Having said that, there are reasons to believe that
minority Christians may be politically engaged. First of all, many ethnic minority Christians
belong to protestant denominations,which in the classicAmerican literature are considered
to put more value on teaching the civic skills necessary for political participation. Also,
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some of these denominations, particularly Pentecostal, are traditionally associated with
black Christians and may be expected to have the same effect as black churches in the
United States.
Our hypotheses, then, are that regular attendance at a place of worship increases
minority political participation, and that this effect is mediated both by the psychological
resources (including racial consciousness) which regular attendance develops and by direct
encouragement from the place of worship.We also hypothesise that the effect of attendance
on participation is moderated by the character of the place of worship: this might be either
a result of the community processes at an ethnically homogeneous place of worship, or as
a result of the historical political concerns and politicised identities associated with Islam
and Sikhism in Britain, but not with Hinduism or Christianity.
The claim that religious attendance increases participation is causal, but this causality
can always be contested in non-experimental research. Some critics posit that the influence
of attendance is simply because religiously active people are generalist ‘joiners’ and there-
fore have an overall tendency to participate in many forms of public life (Van der Meer &
Van Ingen 2009). While in cross-sectional research one cannot definitively identify causal
effects, we propose to take account of any ‘generalist’ joining tendency by controlling in our
analysis for non-political associational involvement, which we think is a reasonable proxy
for a general tendency to participate in public life. Furthermore, by proposing specific
hypotheses about mediators and moderators, we can narrow down the search for causation
to precisely defined causal mechanisms.Again, this cannot be definitive, but a mechanism-
based approach offers the possibility of greater confidence in one’s causal claims.
Data and measurement
We use the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (EMBES) (Heath et al 2010).
EMBES contains 2,787 minority respondents, composed of the following: Indian 587,
Pakistani 668,Bangladeshi 270,Caribbean 597 andAfrican 524.Of these respondents, 2,410
declared that they belong to a religion: 1,140 to Islam, 841 to Christianity, 234 to Hinduism
and 164 to Sikhism. These are the main religions in the United Kingdom and we have
therefore limited our analyses to them.
Our outcome measures are electoral and non-electoral political participation. Electoral
participation is measured as a validated vote at the last parliamentary election in 2010,
which was validated using administrative records, enabling us to correct for over-reporting
of turnout. For the respondents who did not express their consent to match vote validation
to their survey responses, turnout was imputed.3 Five measures were used to capture the
less ubiquitous non-electoral participation,with respondents who engaged in any of the five
activities in the 12 months preceding the 2010 election coded as participants. The activities
were: being active in a political voluntary organisation; donating money to a political cause;
attending a demonstration; signing a petition; and boycotting or buying a product on
political grounds. Since all of these forms of participation are quite different, they have been
analysed separately as well as together, but the results of the separate analyses did not
depart from what is presented here. Factor analysis confirmed that these activities formed
one factor, although reliability was relatively poor at 0.56.
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We use two measures of religious involvement: whether respondents consider them-
selves as belonging to a religion, and religious attendance. We coded those who attended
their place of worship at least once a month as attending regularly.
To test the first set of mediating mechanisms, we include measures of psychological
resources: political trust, efficacy and the perception of racial prejudice (as a proxy for racial
consciousness), political knowledge, interest in politics and sense of duty to vote.4To test the
second, we include a measure of whether respondents were encouraged to vote in their
place of worship.
To test for the two proposed moderating mechanisms we include interaction effects of
attendance with co-ethnicity of the place of worship (coded as 1 when respondents said
‘most’ of their co-worshippers are from the same ethnic group as themselves), and with
religious tradition (Christian, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh).
All multivariate models include demographic controls: age, gender, class (middle or
working), education (degree, A-level equivalent, and anything below as reference cat-
egory), house tenure (homeowner, social housing and renting privately as reference cat-
egory) and local area deprivation.We also control for being born in Britain or elsewhere,
and for fluency in English – the lack of which may be a major obstacle to political
participation. In the case of voting models, we also include controls for strength of party
identity and for external political mobilisation: being contacted by a political party.
To control for the confounding possibility that both political and religious participa-
tion are caused by a general tendency to participate in all forms of public life, we
also include a measure of other forms of social participation in our models (based on
belonging to non-religious and non-political organisations and clubs). Measures of
associational involvement of this kind have been shown to be powerful predictors of
political participation in their own right (see, e.g., Morales & Giugni 2011; Heath et al.
2011, 2013).
Setting the scene
Before we can plausibly argue that religious participation generates political resources to
compensate ethnic minorities for their relatively poor socioeconomic resources, we must
confirm that religious attendance is in fact a major part of minorities’ associational experi-
ence. In Table 1 we compare the various forms of social involvement: religious attendance,
social participation (in apolitical associations) and the two forms of political participation:
electoral and non-electoral. Regular religious attendance among minorities in Britain is
high – above 60 per cent for most groups, apart from Hindus (42 per cent). Importantly, it
is the most ubiquitous form of participation in public life, apart from voting. Looking at the
relationship between religious attendance and political participation in Table 1 we see that
most groups with high levels of attendance also have high levels of participation.There are
some exceptions, however – most notably Catholics, who attend their places of worship
most often, have average non-electoral participation rates but low levels of turnout; and the
Hindus, who have low attendance and non-electoral participation, but high turnout.
However, the presence of a broad pattern of relationship between attendance and partici-
pation conforms to our expectation.
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Similarly, before we test whether direct encouragement to vote from a place of worship
matters for turnout, we must establish whether places of worship in fact issue any such
encouragement.Table 2 shows which religious adherents heard these political messages.We
can see that there are some large differences between religions and denominations of
Christianity in their approach to politics. Contrary to the hypothesis that Islam is an insular
religion, Muslims are not the most inward-looking and politically shy religion. Although
only a third of Muslim respondents had heard a message encouraging them to vote at their
mosque, they are not far behind average. In contrast, only 18 per cent of Hindus said that
their temple encouraged them to vote.The Christian minorities were the most politicised by
their church, but the variations were large: whereas the Pentecostal churches were most
likely to encourage their members, Catholics reported the least direct encouragement to
vote.
Similarly, before we test whether the effect of religious attendance on political partici-
pation is mediated through increased psychological resources, we need to first establish
whether there is any relationship between church attendance and levels of psychological
resources.Table 3 shows that religious attendance is associated with some, but not all, of the
suggested psychological resources. It does not have a relationship with the sense of duty to
vote, which undermines the theory that church instils participatory norms (Olsen 1970) – or
Table 1. Religion and participation in public life (weighted percentages)
Anglican Catholic Pentecostal
Other
Christian Hindu Sikh Muslim
Regular religious
attendance*
61 71 85 72 45 64 66
Electoral
participation**
72 63 72 61 67 79 70
Political
participation***
43 32 40 33 26 35 31
Social participation 41 43 46 42 39 46 32
N (unweighted) 120 206 257 258 234 164 1,140
Notes: * Attending at least once a month (includes only those who belong to a religion). ** Out of those
eligible and registered. *** Having done ANY out of five possible political acts has been coded as partici-
pation – see data section.
Source: Heath et al. (2010).
Table 2. Political culture in places of worship (weighted percentages)
Anglican Catholic Pentecostal Other Christian Hindu Sikh Muslim
Respondent
encouraged to
vote by place of
worship
37 29 56 30 18 38 32
N (unweighted) 120 206 257 258 234 164 1,140
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interest in politics, or political knowledge.These variables, as a result, will now be treated as
controls rather than mediators in our multivariate analysis. However, attendance is corre-
lated with levels of the resources included by Calhoun-Brown (1996): those who attend
church regularly have higher levels of political efficacy and trust, and they perceive more
racial prejudice than those who do not attend. Interestingly, these resources are also higher
among those who do not attend regularly but report belonging to a religion than among
those who do not belong at all.
Finally, before considering whether co-ethnic places of worship perform better at mobi-
lising their members to participate in politics, we must investigate how many religions had
predominantly majority-minority places of worship. Table 4 shows that there is consider-
able variation between religious groups; most Hindus (75 per cent), Sikhs (87 per cent) and
Muslims (60 per cent) attend ethnically homogenous places of worship, whereas the Chris-
tians attend more diverse churches. Among denominations, Pentecostals attend co-ethnic
churches most often (45 per cent) and Catholics the least (only 19 per cent). This is
explained to a great degree by the differences in the ethnic diversity of religions and
denominations in Britain.
Impact of regular religious attendance on political participation in Britain
We now turn to multivariate data analysis of non-electoral participation and of voting,
respectively. Initially,we look at the impact of religious attendance on political participation
controlling for the usual predictors, but not trying to establish what mechanisms mediate or
moderate this impact. For both types of political participation we present two logistic
Table 3. Differences in psychological resources by religious belonging and attendance (N = 2,787)
Political
trust Efficacy Interest Knowledge
Duty
to vote
Perceive
prejudice
Δ belonging – not belonging +* +* 0 0 – +*
Δ attending – not attending +* +* 0 0 0 +*
Range 1–11 1–11 1–5 0–7 1–5 0–1
Notes: * Differences significant at 0.000 level. ‘+’ indicates higher levels of resources among those who
belong to a religion as opposed to those who don’t belong to one, and among those who attend regularly in
comparison to those who do not attend regularly but belong to a religion.
Table 4. Proportion of majority co- ethnic places of worship by religion and denomination
Anglican Catholic Pentecostal
Other
Christian Hindu Sikh Muslim
Predominantly co-ethnic (%) 22 19 45 40 75 87 60
N (unweighted) 120 206 252 258 234 164 1,140
Note: Those who refused to specify their religion are excluded.
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regression models: one for the entire sample of minorities and the other for minorities who
reported belonging to a religion (Table 5). In the first model, for all minorities, we introduce
the usual sociodemographic controls (including political resources such as interest and
knowledge, which did not correlate with religious attendance), plus place of birth and
fluency in English.At this stage we also introduce the control for the possibly confounding
influence of the general tendency to participate, measured here by social participation, and
controls for ethnic origin (which were not in fact significant and therefore are not included
in the final models shown). In this first model we include respondents who declared no
religious belonging as a reference group against which those who belong but do not attend
Table 5. Impact of regular religious attendance on political and electoral participation
Political participation Electoral participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All minorities Religious only All minorities Religious only
Age 0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00) 0.04* (0.02) 0.05* (0.02)
Gender (ref: male) 0.07 (0.12) 0.07 (0.12) −0.04 (0.11) −0.08 (0.11)
Fluency in English 0.33** (0.17) 0.33* (0.17) −0.23 (0.15) −0.19 (0.15)
UK born 0.41*** (0.16) 0.41*** (0.16) 0.75*** (0.14) 0.69*** (0.14)
Housing tenure (ref: private rent)
Homeowner 0.19 (0.13) 0.28 (0.17) 0.79*** (0.14) 0.70*** (0.16)
Social housing 0.16 (0.14) 0.19 (0.18) 0.33* (0.15) 0.39* (0.16)
Middle class 0.22 (0.14) 0.22 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.07 (0.13)
Education (ref: below A-level)
Degree 0.37* (0.15) 0.37* (0.15) −0.04 (0.14) −0.04 (0.14)
A-level 0.47*** (0.15) 0.47*** (0.15) −0.10 (0.14) −0.10 (0.14)
Neighbourhood deprivation
Co-ethnic density in
neighbourhood
−0.22 (0.41) −0.22 (0.41) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Std political knowledge 0.22*** (0.05) 0.23*** (0.06) 0.12* (0.06) 0.12* (0.06)
Std political interest 0.35*** (0.06) 0.31*** (0.07) 0.12* (0.06) 0.12* (0.06)
Std political duty 0.05 (0.07) 0.05 (0.07) 0.28* (0.05) 0.28* (0.05)
Party identity – – 0.51*** (0.11) 0.51*** (0.11)
Contacted by political party – – 0.43*** (0.13) 0.43*** (0.13)
Social participation 1.22*** (0.11) 1.22*** (0.11) −0.02 (0.12) −0.08 (0.12)
Religious attendance (ref: not
belonging
Occasional attendance −0.23 (0.18) Reference 0.34 (0.18) Reference
Regular attendance 0.17 (0.11) 0.41*** (0.14) 0.51*** (0.16) 0.17 (0.14)
Constant −2.5*** (0.55) −2.7 (0.56) −2.0*** (0.56) −1.7*** (0.55)
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.16 0.11 0.11
N (unweighted) 2,787 2,410 2,712 2,344
Notes: Data are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for clustering as a result of sample design.
Statistical significance levels: *** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05. Std = variables standardised.
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regularly and those who attend regularly are compared. In the second model we exclude
those who declared no belonging and directly compare regular attendance with occasional
attendance.
The first two columns in Table 5 present models of non-electoral political participation.
When we look at the model for all minorities (model 1) and for those belonging to a religion
only (model 2) we see that, the controls operate in the expected way. In model 1 neither
the parameter estimate for occasional attendance nor regular attendance is significantly
different from the reference category (non-membership), but model 2, which excludes
those who said they did not belong to a religion, shows that the difference between
occasional and regular attendance is indeed statistically significant, supporting our hypoth-
esis that regular religious attendance increases political participation. Further analysis
shows that the difference amounts to five percentage points.5 Crucially, this effect holds
after controlling for social participation thus signalling that a distinct causal effect of
attendance – apart from the general tendency to participate in public life – is plausible. In
its own right, social participation is a large and significant positive predictor of non-electoral
participation.
Looking at the last two columns in Table 5, which present models for voter turnout,
contrary to what we found for non-electoral participation, regular religious attendance is a
significant and positive predictor of turnout, when compared with the reference category of
people who did not belong to any religion (model 3), although the difference between
occasional and regular attendees does not reach statistical significance (model 4). Hence,
religious belonging, not attendance, does most of the work in the case of turnout. Also
in contrast to non-electoral participation, the effect of social participation is tiny and
non-significant.
Mediating and moderating mechanisms
We now turn to examine the two mediating and two moderating effects suggested by the
literature. For any mediating mechanism to be observed, preliminary tests must be con-
ducted to establish that the mediated variable is in fact related to the outcome variable (this
has been done in Table 5 where we show that attendance does impact political participa-
tion) and that the mediated variable and the mediating mechanism are also correlated (this
has been done in Table 3 where we show that political resources correlated with regular
attendance). We did not show the relationship between hearing direct encouragement to
vote in the place of worship and attendance in Table 3, but we did confirm this had a
relationship with regular attendance. Of the EMBES respondents who belonged to a
religion, but did not attend regularly, 20 per cent reported that they heard direct encour-
agement messages, compared to 40 per cent of those who attended their places of worship
regularly.
In this section,we turn to the final step, in which we will observe if there is any reduction
in the impact of the mediated variable (attendance) on the outcome variable (participation)
when the mediating mechanism is introduced. We will also test the two proposed moder-
ating effects: with ethnically homogeneous places of worship better at mobilising their
worshipers; and regular attendance increasing political participation among Muslims and
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Sikhs but not among Hindus and Christians. We expected significant interaction effects
between regular attendance and the moderating variables.
We added mediating and moderating effects to the base models presented in Table 5 for
each of non-electoral and electoral participation. Therefore, to compare the impact of
moderating and mediating variables on the religious attendance main effect we need to
compareTable 5 withTable 66:model 2 with models 5 and 6, and model 4 with models 7 and
8.We present the analysis of mediating and moderating mechanisms for religious respond-
ents only for non-electoral political participation as the first step models presented in
Table 6. Mediating and moderating mechanisms for the impact of regular religious attendance on political
and electoral participation
Political participation Electoral participation
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Mediators Moderators Mediators Moderators
Controls as in Table 5
Occasional attendance† – – 0.35 (0.19) –
Regular attendance 0.28* (0.14) −0.23 (0.25) 0.52*** (0.17) 0.57* (0.22)
Mediator variables
Political trust – std −0.25** (0.06) −0.24*** (0.06) −0.01 (0.07) −0.10 (0.07)
Political efficacy – std 0.19*** (0.06) 0.20*** (0.06) 0.07 (0.06) 0.05 (0.06)
Perceives prejudice 0.34** (0.16) 0.34* (0.17) −0.26 (0.15) −0.13 (0.15)
Vote encouragement 0.46*** (0.12) 0.45*** (0.12) −0.13 (0.14)
Moderator variables
Co-ethnic Church 0.16 (0.26) 0.39 (0.23)
Regular attendance*Co-ethnic
Church
−0.02 (0.30) −0.07 (0.27)
Religion (ref: Christian)
Muslim −0.23 (0.29) 0.66*** (0.24)
Sikh −1.09*** (0.42) 1.14** (0.47)
Hindu −0.75* (0.33) 0.09 (0.31)
Regular attendance* 0.72* (0.34) −0.51 (0.29)
Muslim
Regular attendance* 1.24* (0.55) −0.53 (0.59)
Sikh
Regular attendance* 0.54 (0.45) −0.42 (0.43)
Hindu
Constant −2.7*** (0.56) −1.9*** (0.55) −2.0*** (0.55) −2.1*** (0.53)
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.11
N (unweighted) 2,787 2,410 2,712 2,344
Notes: Data are weighted and standard errors are adjusted for clustering as a result of sample design.
Statistical significance levels: *** p ≤ 0.001; ** p ≤ 0.01; * p ≤ 0.05. Std = variables standardised. † For
models 5, 6 and 8, only religious respondents are included; therefore, ‘Occasional attendance’ is the
reference category.
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Table 5 showed regular attendance as a significant effect in the model for religious minor-
ities only.
First, looking at the two models for non-electoral political participation (the first two
columns in Table 6) we see that all our mediating variables are statistically significant.
Sense of efficacy and perception of prejudice both have positive and statistically signifi-
cant impacts, while political trust has a significant negative impact. Hearing a political
message in a place of worship increases the probability of participation by ten percentage
points.We can also see that there has been a reduction in the size of the effect of regular
attendance after the introduction of controls (if one compares it to the base model 2 from
Table 5) from 0.41 to 0.28, although it remains borderline significant. As a result, we feel
that the mediators do mediate some, but not all, of the impact of religious attendance on
political participation.
The impact of moderating variables is rather more uneven. Looking at model 6 in
Table 6, attending an ethnically homogenous church does not have a significant impact on
political participation in its own right, or as a moderator in interaction with regular attend-
ance. The effect of regular attendance does, however, seem to depend on which religion is
involved.Christianity is the reference category in this model. First, we find that Hindus,who
are the group least politicised in the United Kingdom, are less likely to engage in non-
electoral participation than Christians, and that this holds equally true for occasional and
regular attendees alike. Sikhs, who are the most politicised religious group, are – as we
expected – more politicised by their place of worship in contrast. While those Sikhs who
attend occasionally are much less likely to participate than Christians who do not worship
regularly, regularly attending Sikhs are 14 percentage points more likely to participate than
Sikhs who attend only occasionally. Muslims who do not regularly attend are as likely as
Christians to participate, but – again as we expected – regular attendance in a mosque
increases the probability of participation by seven percentage points. Finally, while as we
saw in Table 2, minority ethnic Christians are encouraged to vote in their places of worship
more than other minorities, their church attendance has a weaker relationship with political
engagement than for Sikhs and Muslims.
Turning now to the last two columns in Table 6 – the models for turnout – we observe
that none of the hypothesised mediating mechanisms have a significant effect on turnout,
which is especially surprising in the case of direct encouragement to vote.Consequently, the
effect of regular attendance on vote remains unchanged from the base model 3 in Table 5.
To test our moderating mechanisms in model 8, we include the religious minorities only.We
again introduce the measure of ethnically homogenous place of worship and moderating
effects of different religious traditions on the impact of regular attendance. Similarly to
what we saw for non-electoral participation, members of a co-ethnic church who attend
regularly are not more likely to vote than those who regularly attend non co-ethnic places
of worship. Thus, both in terms of electoral and non-electoral participation, we see no
special impact of a co-ethnic place of worship. Again, however, we see some interesting
effects of individual religions. The main effect coefficient parameters, translated into pre-
dicted probabilities, show that among those minorities who attend only occasionally,
Muslims are five points and Sikhs 12 points more likely to vote than occasionally attending
Christians. This gives a picture of higher overall levels of electoral participation among
these two religious groups, but since the interaction terms for these groups are of a similar
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size but in the opposite direction as the main effect of regular attendance, the model overall
suggests that turnout does not vary with the frequency of attendance for Sikhs andMuslims.
A similar story of compensating interaction and attendance main effect is true for Hindus,
but without a strong Hindu main effect. In contrast, Christians who attend regularly
are significantly more likely to vote than occasional Christian attendees. This is
further confirmed by running separate regressions for each religious group separately (not
shown), which confirms that regular attendance has a significant impact only on Christian
minorities’ turnout.
Conclusions
Our analysis has shown that in the 2010 British Parliamentary Elections regular religious
attendance was associated with increased levels of political participation among racial and
ethnic minorities, similarly to what has been found in the United States. Religious attend-
ance is one of the main forms of associational life among racial and ethnic minorities, and
functions as an important source of political mobilisation in both countries.We found that
many minority groups who regularly attended were more likely to participate in non-
electoral activities and to vote. Our evidence on the mediating mechanisms is consistent
with the hypothesis that attendance bolsters the psychological resources that directly
contribute to non-electoral political participation – namely political efficacy and a percep-
tion of racial prejudice (Calhoun-Brown 1996).We also found that the political culture of
a place of worship (measured by direct encouragement to vote) had a significant, direct
effect on participation as is the case in the United States (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Djupe and
Grant 2001) – although surprisingly only for non-electoral participation. Overall we can
conclude that religious attendance is a significant political resource for ethnic minorities in
Britain.
The major new finding of this study is that religious attendance has a strong positive
effect on non-electoral participation in the case of those religions – Islam and Sikhism – that
are politically salient, but not in the case of Hinduism, which is not politicised in Britain to
the same extent. In this way, out of the three proposed mechanisms through which religion
might influence political participation, it is the notion of a highly politicised religion that
finds most support. Christianity presents a more complex case, where regular attendance
bolsters electoral, but not non-electoral participation, which chimes with the fact that
Christians are most likely to hear direct messages encouraging them to vote in their
churches.
We hypothesised that the effect of religious attendance could be mediated through
increased psychological resources, such as racial consciousness, but the effect of the sepa-
rate religious traditions remained significant after controlling for this mechanism.We also
thought that the attendance effect could be a proxy for ethnic social capital and other forms
of co-ethnic mobilisation, but we found that co-ethnicity of the place of worship was
non-significant. In the end, it was our expectations developed by looking at religions’
political history and struggles in their countries of origin and/or destination that were met.
In our study, the gurdwaras and mosques seem equivalent to the African American black
churches in the United States, implying that it is the history of political engagement through
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one’s religious group or place of worship and not a general tendency to join, or a mere
experience of attendance, that drives the link between regular attendance and political
engagement for racial and minority groups. The history of homeland political struggles of
Sikhs, the current political salience of Islamophobia in Britain and of international conflicts
involving Muslims appear to be crucial.
While our results in many respects mirror those found in the United States, it is
important not to generalise them too rashly. As Eggert and Giugni (2011) convincingly
argue, the role of religion in political mobilisation may be contingent on the opportunity
structures provided by national political contexts. We would also add to this that the
political salience of religion matters as well, and in the British context we can see that this
can be generalised beyond Islam – arguably the most politicised religion in European
society. Nevertheless, to find a comparable relationship between religious attendance and
political participation, and support for two of the proposed explanatory mechanisms, in a
different context, shows that the general theory of religion and politics can be a useful
analytical framework in other countries and religions. We also hope that our distinction
between mediating and moderating mechanisms will remain a useful organisational prin-
ciple in any future studies of the relationship between religious attendance and political
participation.
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Notes
1. For a rare example of a European study, see Eggert and Giugni (2011). They found some effects of
religious involvement on participation of Muslims in London.
2. Sharma accuses rival candidate of supporting violence, Press Trust of India, 29 April 2010.
3. The imputation was performed based on the administratively validated turnout data.We sampled from
the known distribution of validated vote adding a random ‘noise’ term to create an imputed vote
variable. This variable is extremely highly correlated with the actual vote validation data, and it makes
more use of the available information than the alternative imputation methods.
4. The measures of political resources are standardised in the multivariate analysis to have a mean of 0 and
a standard deviation of 1 to deal with the different scales on which they are measured.This makes their
effects more directly comparable.
5. We estimate the marginal effects using the ‘margins’ command in STATA.We set most of the values at
mean, with dichotomous variables set as: man (differences between genders were not significant), born
in the UK, working class, fluent in English and with no A-levels.
6. Table 6 does not present the controls used in the models as they were all the same as in Table 5 and were
not substantively or substantially changed from what is presented in Table 5.
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